【Holding】
[1] Where a claim is judicially made for only one of the insurance proceeds under the main contract (basic contract) or a rider (optional contract) of an insurance contract, whether the extinctive prescription of the other insurance claim arising from the same basic legal relationship is also interrupted if the claim can be regarded as a manifestation that the claimant is not sleeping on his or her rights with respect to the other insurance claim as well (affirmative), and the criteria for determining whether the effect of interruption of prescription by a judicial claim for insurance proceeds under the main contract or a rider extends to the other insurance claim
[2] In a case where B, who had concluded with A insurance company a driver insurance contract with coverage for serious automobile accident injuries as the main contract (basic contract) and coverage for automobile accident injuries as a rider (optional contract), filed a suit against A company seeking payment of insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries under the main contract, alleging that B had suffered a Grade 1 injury in a traffic accident, and, after the three-year extinctive prescription period under Article 662 of the Commercial Act had elapsed from the date of the accident, submitted to the lower court an application for amendment of the purport and cause of claim additionally seeking payment of insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries under the rider, the Court held that, in light of all the circumstances, B's filing of the suit claiming insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries constituted a judicial claim interrupting the extinctive prescription of the claim for insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries under the rider, and thereby the extinctive prescription of the claim for insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries was interrupted
【Summary of Decision】
[1] The rationale of the prescription system lies in respecting a long-continued factual state and in not protecting those who sleep on their rights, and the latter meaning is particularly strong in extinctive prescription; therefore, where a right holder asserts the right judicially and thereby manifests that he or she is not sleeping on the right, it constitutes a ground for interruption of prescription. A judicial claim as a ground for interruption of prescription should be regarded as including not only a claim for performance or confirmation of the very right subject to extinctive prescription, but also an assertion made in the form of a suit on the basis of the basic legal relationship from which the right arose, where it can be regarded as a manifestation that the right holder is not sleeping on the right, and it is not necessary to consider a judicial claim as a ground for interruption of prescription in conformity with the scope of res judicata.
The same applies in determining whether, where a rider (optional contract) is attached to the main contract (basic contract) upon conclusion of an insurance contract, the prescription of the claim for insurance proceeds under the rider or the main contract is interrupted by a judicial claim for payment of insurance proceeds under the main contract or the rider. Since, in attaching a rider to the main contract of an insurance contract, the standard terms for the rider are included together with the standard terms for the main contract in order to expand or reduce the scope of coverage, the scopes of insured events respectively covered may overlap in whole or in part; therefore, even where a claim is judicially made for only one of the insurance proceeds under the main contract or the rider, if this can be regarded as a manifestation that the claimant is not sleeping on his or her rights with respect to the other insurance claim arising from the same basic legal relationship as well, the extinctive prescription of the other insurance claim should also be regarded as interrupted. In this regard, whether the effect of interruption of prescription by a judicial claim for insurance proceeds under the main contract or the rider extends to the other insurance claim should be determined, separately from the scope of res judicata, by comprehensively considering various circumstances, including the content of the insured events respectively covered by the main contract and the rider, the nature of the insurance, and the perception or intent of the insurance claimant who claimed payment of the insurance proceeds.
[2] In a case where B, who had concluded with A insurance company a driver insurance contract with coverage for serious automobile accident injuries as the main contract (basic contract) and coverage for automobile accident injuries as a rider (optional contract), filed a suit against A company seeking payment of insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries under the main contract, alleging that B had suffered a Grade 1 injury in a traffic accident, and, after the three-year extinctive prescription period under Article 662 of the Commercial Act had elapsed from the date of the accident, submitted to the lower court an application for amendment of the purport and cause of claim additionally seeking payment of insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries under the rider, the Court held as follows: the claim for insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries made by B upon filing the suit was under the main contract of the insurance contract, and the claim for insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries added in the lower court was under the rider of the same insurance contract attached to the main contract; ① the insured events covered by the main contract and the rider overlap, being "where a Grade 1 to 3 injury as prescribed in Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Security Act is sustained due to a traffic accident" and "where an injury grade as prescribed in Article 3 of the said Enforcement Decree is sustained due to a traffic accident," respectively, and both are a type of accident insurance and thus have the same insurance nature; ② since B satisfied the grounds for payment of both the insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries and the insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries by sustaining a Grade 1 injury as prescribed in Article 3 of the said Enforcement Decree in the accident, the basic legal relationship underlying the claim for insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries and the claim for insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries is the same; and ③ there are no circumstances suggesting that B, upon filing the suit, claimed only the insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries under the main contract while being aware of the possibility of claiming insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries under the rider; therefore, B's filing of the suit claiming insurance proceeds for serious automobile accident injuries constituted a judicial claim interrupting the extinctive prescription of the claim for insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries under the rider, and thereby the extinctive prescription of the claim for insurance proceeds for automobile accident injuries was interrupted; nevertheless, the lower court, which held otherwise, erred in its misapprehension of legal principles.
【Referenced Statutes】
[1] Articles 168 subparag. 1 and 170 of the Civil Act [2] Articles 168 subparag. 1 and 170 of the Civil Act; Article 662 of the Commercial Act
【Referenced Precedents】
[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da32053, March 31, 1992 (Gong1992, 1406)
Supreme Court Decision 2011Da19737, July 14, 2011 (Gong2011Ha, 1615)
(Source: Supreme Court Decision 2026Da200535, August 12, 2026 | Judicial Information Disclosure Portal, Precedents)
2026. 10. 14. · By Attorney Dongwoo Shin
Call
KakaoTalk
E-mail